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The Sovereignty of Indian Tribes: A Reaffirmation
And Strengthening in the 1970's
Keith M. Werhan*
I. Introduction
A government exercising sovereignty within the territorial domain of a far
more powerful, conquering sovereign is an anomaly;1 dual citizenship, tribal
and American, with quite different rights and duties, is also an anomaly.2 Yet
the map of the United States is flecked with these anomalies.3 The renewed
assertion by Indian tribes of their sovereign powers poses puzzling and unique
questions of sociology, political science, and law. The Supreme Court in recent
years, and in particular in its 1977 term, reaffirmed the doctrine that Indian
tribes possess very real but limited sovereignty.4
* Member, District of Columbia Bar. J.D., The George Washington University 1975.
B.B.A., University of Notre Dame 1972. The author has participated as co-counsel for the
Delaware Tribal Business Committee in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73 (1977); as co-counsel for the National Tribal Chairmen's Association (NTCA); as
arnicus curiae in support of the tribal parties, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 98 S.Ct. 1670
(1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 98 S.Ct. 1011 (1978); and in Puyallup Tribe,
Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), all discussed herein. The views
expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Delaware Tribal Business Committee or of
NTCA.
1 See W. BIsHoP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (3d ed. 1971). Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, in one of the major decisions laying the foundation of Federal Indian Law, observed:
"Most usually, [citizens of conquered nations] are incorporated with the victorious nation, and
become subjects or citizens of the government with which they are connected. The new and
old members of the society mingle with each other; the distinction between them is gradually
lost, and they make one people." Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
This wholesale assimilation has never occurred with the American Indian tribes, notwithstanding
occasional assaults on tribal societies by the various institutions of, this nation. See gen-
erally 1 Am. Indian Pol'y Rev. Comm'n Final Rep. 51-82 (1977); Comment, The Indian
Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. Ry. 445 (1970). The special status of Indian
tribes has survived the end of the treaty-making period in 1871, 25 U.S.C. §71 (1976) ; Board
of County Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 (1943); F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
274 (1971), the admission of the Western territories as states of the Union, e.g., United States
v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 469 (1926), and the conferral of United States citizenship on Indians
in 1924, 8 U.S.C. §1401 (a) (2) (1976) ; e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,
411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973). Marshall's insight remains as true today as it was nearly 150
years ago: "The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike
that of any other two people in existence." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1, 16 (1831).
2 See note 1 supra. Tribal citizenship is a status that can yield palpable benefits to
members. See e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978); Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
By virtue of their United States citizenship, tribal members are citizens of the states
within whose boundaries they reside. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
3 There are 287 tribal governments operating within the United States. Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1681 n.21 (1978).
4 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978) ; United States v. Wheeler, 98
S.Ct. 1079 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 98 S.Ct. 1011 (1978). The Court
also held in the 1977 term that the land designated by the federal government as a reservation
for the Choctaw Indians was "Indian country" within the meaning of the Major Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. §1153 (1976), and, accordingly, that federal courts, but not state courts, hadjurisdiction to try those alleged of committing a crime included in the Act. United States
v. John, 46 U.S.L.W. 4806 (U.S. 1978).
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The concept of sovereignty originated in the sixteenth century,5 when many
Indian nations were thriving.6 This doctrine was developed in Europe to order
the relations of then-emerging, independent and equal states subject to no com-
mon, political, superior power.' As articulated by Jean Bodin in De Republica,
published in 1576, each state possesses a power, termed sovereignty, that is the
source of law, but which is not bound by law.'
The doctrine of sovereignty was applied to the indigenous Indians by the
British colonists of America, who dealt with tribes as independent nations with
whom formal treaties and agreements could be, and were, executed.9 This policy
coexisted with the Crown's claim of sovereignty in all lands discovered in its
name; but that claim was directed against other European powers, not against
the tribes.'0
This confused policy is readily explained, not by theory, but by simple prag-
matics. English colonies had to deal with the tribes in their vicinity to solve
problems as they arose." The response to this need was a series of agreements
that acknowledged the right of Indians to occupy the land claimed by the Crown,
but that recognized that these lands could be transferred to colonists as a result
of war, sale, or the departure of the original inhabitants. 2
Similarly, pragmatics in large part explain the manner in which the "much-
abused word,"" sovereignty, has been applied to America's Indian tribes. Sover-
eignty is power, pure and simple. 4 Application of the doctrine of sovereignty
to Indian tribes acknowledges simply and fundamentally that they are .govern-
ments with the authority to manage their own affairs within their own territory. 5
5 See W. BISHOP, JR., supra note 1, at 12. Certain international rules and institutions
resembling our contemporary system of international law, however, are found in ancient China
and India, Classical Greece, and in early European history. Id.
6 For example, the Santa Clara Pueblo has been in existence for over six hundred years.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1673 (1978).
7 See W. BISHOP, JR., supra note 1, at 12. Among the factors contributing to the develop-
ment of the modern system of International Law were the discovery of America and the later
European conquests of the Indian people and overseas settlements. Id.
8 Id. Although free from domestic law, a state's sovereign power was considered bound
by divine law, natural law, and by the law of nations. Id.
9 Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 12, 12 (1976).
10 Id. at 12-13. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). European
governments denied each other's assertions of sovereignty over lands casually explored or
lightly settled. Washburn, supra note 9, at 13. Occupation, not discovery, increasingly be-
came proof of sovereignty, as recognized by the states of Europe. Id. European sovereignty
was pressed against Indian nations much later, when the Indians had lost much of their power
and could not adequately defend against the assertion of European title. Id.
11 Washburn, supra note 9, at 13-14.
12 Id. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886). This has been termed
the right of preemption, as articulated by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Secretary
of War Henry Knox in the 1790's. Washburn, supra note 9, at 13. It has been suggested that
purchase was the principal means by which Indians transferred title to the present area of
the United States to non-Indians. Id. at 14.
13 J. L. BRIERi.Y, LAW OF NATIONS 142 (4th ed. 1949).
14 Id. Mr. Brierly explained:
At the basis of international law lies the notion that a state occupies a definite
part of the surface of the earth, within which it normally exercises, subject to the
limitations imposed by international law, jurisdiction over persons and things to the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of other states. When a state exercises an authority of
this kind over a certain territory it is popularly said to have "sovereignty" over the
territory. ...
Id.
15 Id.; 1 Am. Indian Pol'y Rev. Comm'n Final Rep. 99-100 (1977).
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This surface simplicity yields to ambiguity, however, when one attempts
to integrate the sovereignty of Indian tribes, their right of self-government, with
the sovereignty of the fifty states and the supreme sovereignty of the United
States. This allocation of power among governments, although often discussed
and argued in esoteric applications of legal precedent, is, at its core, an attempt
to operate the machinery of government by the peaceful coexistence of power
centers with different constituencies and often with competing interests. This is
why the Supreme Court has been asked, for over 150 years, to delineate the
nature and powers offribal governments and their place within the American
system. And this is why the Court repeatedly has obliged.
The Court, in its October Term, 1977, issued three decisions that are im-
portant links in the continuing process of defining the powers of tribal govern-
ments. 6 This article will discuss the Court's opinions in these cases in the his-
torical context of its decisions on the nature and powers of tribal governments,
which extends to the beginning of American jurisprudence.
II. The Marshall Decisions
Early in the nineteenth century, Chief Justice John Marshall laid the foun-
dation upon which the doctrine of Indian tribal sovereignty has been developed.
The Chief Justice had little guidance from the Constitution, wherein Indians
are mentioned only twice." The commerce clause gives Congress power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes,"' 8 but this provision hardly settled the precise nature of
tribal status or the relations of the tribes with the states or the federal government.
Chief Justice Marshall drew on principles of International Law, past dealings
of European governments and the English colonies with the tribes, and basic
common sense to formulate a judicial approach to relations with Indian tribes
and their people that, with modification, thrives to this day.
In Johnson v. McIntosh,"5 the Court held that courts of the United States
could not recognize transfers of title to land from Indian tribes to private indi-
viduals."0 To reach this result, Chief Justice Marshall equated rights by dis-
covery with rights by conquest, "[h]owever extravagant [this] pretension . . .
may appear."" Discovery gave title to the Government, to the exclusion of all
other European competitors, and provided the discoverer the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the Indian inhabitants." Although the tribes were
16 See note 4 supra.
17 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886). It has been suggested that
these constitutional provisions are not a conclusive source of Federal Indian Law. See Krieger,
Principles of the Indian Law and the Act of June 18, 1934, 3 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 279, 281
(1935). In Mr. Krieger's view, the legal status of Indian tribes must be considered "not as
originating in the Constitution, but as having its roots in international law." Id.
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl.2. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution excludes
"Indians not taxed" when determining a state's representation in the House of Representatives.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl.2.
19 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
20 Id. at 591-92, 604-05. The Court found that the tribal chiefs had authority from their
people to execute the conveyance at issue and that the tribes were in rightful possession of the
land sold. Id. at 572.
21 Id. at 591. The Court found that "title by conquest is acquired and maintained by
force. The conqueror prescribes its limits." Id. at 589.
22 Id. at 573.
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acknowledged to have a right of occupancy, "their rights to complete sovereignty,
as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose
of the soil at their own will, to whomever they pleased, was denied by the orig-
inal fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it."23 All European nations recognized the exclusive right of the discoverer
to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.24 After the revolution, the
American states accepted this European principle, and it had become "the law
of the land," which the courts were powerless to question."
Chief Justice Marshall did not hide his distaste for upholding the Europeans'6'pompous claims"2 to discovered territory, but always the pragmatic theore-
tician, recognized that he had no choice, whatever one's opinion of the "original
justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted." 7 The Chief Justice
understood that he could not sustain a title incompatible with that upon which
the country was settled and later developed. To hold otherwise would have
called into question the legal title upon which the United States rested.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," Chief Justice Marshall adopted the logical
extension of the Johnson rationale; the Court dismissed an original action filed
by the tribe for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Indian tribes are not foreign
nations within the meaning of the Constitution. ° The Cherokees had sought to
enjoin the state from enforcing laws allegedly intended to destroy the tribal
23 Id. at 574. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
24 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 584.
25 Id. at 584-85, 591.
26 Id. at 590. The Court did not wish "to engage in the defence of those principles which
Europeans have applied to Indian title .. " Id. at 589.
27 Id. at 588. Marshall summarized his approach as follows:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited
country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under
it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes
the law of the land, and cannot be questioned. So too, with respect to the con-
comitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occu-
pants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but
to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others. However this
restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the usage of civilized nations,
yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled,
and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be sup-
ported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.
Id. at 591-92.
28 Id. at 588-89. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), the
Court denied a fifth amendment claim for compensation for a taking of timber from Alaskan
lands held under aboriginal Indian title. Relying on Johnson, the Court held that Indian
title is "not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which the sovereign grants
and protects against intrusion by third parties but which . . .may be terminated and such
lands fully disposed by the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligation to com-
pensate the Indians." Id. at 279. A compensable property right is conferred where Congress
by treaty or otherwise has declared that thereafter Indians were to hold the lands permanently.
Id. at 278-79. Cf. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 123 (1960) (lands pur-
chased and owned in fee by Indian tribe could be taken by U.S. under power of eminent
domain only upon payment of just compensation). The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton, however, care-
fully distinguished between claims of sovereignty and claims of ownership. 348 U.S. at 287.
Thus, even though tribes do not "own" their reservation lands, it does not necessarily follow
that they cannot assert sovereignty thereon.
29 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
30 Id. at 19, 20. The Constitution, inter alia, extends the "judicial Power .. . to Con-
troversies . . .between a State . . . and foreign States. ... U.S. CONST. art III, §2. This
clause provides further that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to all cases in which
"a State shall be Party. ... Id. See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15-16.
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government and to appropriate tribal lands."
The Chief Justice again wrestled with the nature of Indian tribes and their
place in the young Nation's system of government and jurisprudence, premising
his discussion on the observation that "the relation of the Indians to the United
States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else." 2
He thought it clear that the Cherokees comprised "a state, as a distinct political
society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing
itself.""3 But the tribes could not be considered foreign nations for a simple
reason: Indian territory is a part of the United States. 4 As in Johnson, the
Chief Justice realized that the United States was and must be acknowledged to
be the dominant sovereign and that claims by tribes wholly inconsistent with
that status could not be sustained."
Since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, tribes have been unable to assert a claim
of independent, sovereign status consistent with the Constitution. But also since
that decision, the "peculiar relation"36 between the United States and Indian
nations has been recognized; although not independent of the dominant sover-
eign, tribes have a special status.3 Chief Justice Marshall's appellation has sur-
vived to this day: Indian tribes are aptly described as "domestic dependent
nations.'" '
This view of the status of Indian tribes was cemented a year later in Wor-
31 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15. The Court observed:
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated
to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people once numerous, powerful, and
truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of
an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our
aims, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each of which contains a solemn
guarantee of the residue, until they retain no more of their formerly extensive territory
than is deemed necessary to their comfortable subsistence. To preserve this remnant,
the present application is made.
Id.
32 Id. at 16. See note 1 supra.
33 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. This conclusion was buttressed by the prior dealings of the
Government with Indian people. The Chief Justice found:
[The Cherokees] have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our
country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them
as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being respon-
sible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any
aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their
community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our
government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are
bound by those acts.
Id. See also Higgins, International Law Consideration of the American Indian Nations by the
United States, 3 ARIz. L. REv. 74, 85 (1961); Comment, The Indian Battle For Self-De-
termination, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 445 (1970).
34 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. The Court found additional support for this view from its
reading of the commerce clause, which provides Congress the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. . . ." U.S.
CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The Court concluded that the founders, having distinguished foreign
nations from Indian tribes in article I, had not intended to equate the two in article III.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18-19.
35 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. Tribes "are considered by foreign nations, as well as by our-
selves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that
any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility." Id. at 17-18.
36 Id. at 18.




cester v. Georgia,9 in which Marshall's opinion remains the most important
articulation of the doctrine of Indian tribal sovereignty. In Worcester, the Court
granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus of a non-Indian sentenced by
Georgia to four years' hard labor in the state penitentiary for the offense of
residing on Cherokee land without a license and without having taken a loyalty
oath to the state of Georgia.4" The Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction
by the state over the Cherokee Nation was void." In his classic formulation of
the doctrine of Indian tribal sovereignty, Marshall explained the basis for the
decision as follows:
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the
United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in
the government of the United States.4 2
It remains a lively source of argument whether the basis of the Worcester
decision is the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty or the doctrine of federal
preemption. But surely, as the above language demonstrates, Marshall treated
the two doctrines as intertwined. He found (1) that Indian tribes were indepen-
dent, self-governing nations before the discovery of America," (2) that, after
discovery, Great Britain considered the tribes as nations capable of governing
themselves and of entering into treaty obligations,4 4 and (3) that, consistent with
that policy, the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate a separate
status of the tribes whose intercourse is to be handled only by the central govern-
ment." The federal government did not create the special status of Indian
nations; the Government simply acknowledged it.
If Chief Justice Marshall established the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in
Worcester, he also indicated clearly just how precarious the status of tribes is.
Tribes are distinct, independent "states," but not foreign nations. They are self-
governing political societies, but are also wards of the central government. The
interaction of these seemingly contradictory notions to build a coherent juris-
prudence continued during the nineteenth century with another triumvirate of
Supreme Court decisions.
39 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
40 Id. at 537, 542, 562-63.
41 Id. at 562-63.
42 Id. at 561.
43 Id. at 542-43, 559-60. See text accompanying notes 19-28 supra.
44 Id. at 548-49, 559-60.
45 Id. at 556-57, 561-62. The Court found that Congress "assumed the management of
Indian affairs" because it was necessary that the central representative assembly, "which could
command the confidence of all," handle this sensitive power. Id. at 558.
The Worcester doctrine was embodied by the disclaimer clauses included in the statehood
acts and constitutions of many Western states. Note, State Civil Jurisdiction Over Tribal
Indians-A Re-Examination, 35 MONT. L. RFv. 340, 341 (1974). As a prerequisite to ad-
mission to the Union, each state was required to disclaim all right, title, and jurisdiction over
lands lying within the boundaries of Indian reservations. Id. Authority over Indian lands was
to remain exclusively with the federal government. Id.
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In Ex Parte Crow Dog,46 the Court granted a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus of a member of the Brule Sioux band being held by the United States
marshall of the Dakota Territory under a death sentence for the murder of
another tribal member on the Sioux reservation." The Court necessarily left
jurisdiction over such crimes to the tribe. 8
Although the Crow Dog decision has been termed "[a]n extreme application
of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty,"49 the case technically is one of statutory
construction. The question presented to the Court was whether there was federal
jurisdiction over this crime and, more specifically, whether the federal statutes
that precluded jurisdiction over crimes by one Indian against another Indian
within Indian Country were repealed by a later treaty with the Sioux tribes
and a later act of Congress applicable to some Sioux bands."0 The Court held
that although the Government could have asserted this jurisdiction, it had not."'
The significance of the Crow Dog decision lies not only in its intimation of
the important, inherent powers tribes have retained as sovereigns, but also in
its faithfulness to Chief Justice Marshall's theme of recognizing the tribes' com-
petence to govern themselves except to the extent Congress directs or to the
extent the dominance of the United States is substantially threatened.
The predictable response to the Crow Dog decision was the Major Crimes
Act of 1885,52 which provided federal jurisdiction over seven, now fourteen,
crimes committed within Indian Country by one Indian against another. 3 In
United States v. Kagama," the Court upheld the Major Crimes Act as a lawful
exercise of the power of Congress.55 Congress' power to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes, however, was not considered sufficient to justify imposition of
a system of criminal laws on the tribes.56 The Court found the source of this
46 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
47 Id. at 557, 572.
48 See id. at 568-69; F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 124-25.
49 F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 124.
50 109 U.S, at 562, 570. Section 2145 of the Revised Statutes extended federal juris-
diction to crimes committed within "Indian country," id. at 560, where the Court held the
homicide at issue had occurred, id. at 562. Section 2146 of the Revised Statutes, however,
excepted from section 2145 crimes committed by one Indian against another Indian. Id. It was
section 2146 that the Court held was not repealed and that, accordingly, barred the jurisdiction
asserted by the district court. Id. at 572.
51 Id. at 567, 570. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886).
52 Ch. 341, §9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) '(current version at 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1976)).
53 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1976).
54 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
55 Id. at 385.
56 Id. at 378-79. The Court summarily rejected the commerce clause as a sufficient basis
for the Major Crimes Act: "[I]t would be a very strained construction of this clause, that a
system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations, which left out the
entire code of trade and intercourse laws justly enacted under that provision, and established
punishment for the common law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny,
and the like, without any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized
by the grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes." Id. The Court's reading
of the commerce power differed substantially, however, from that of Chief Justice Marshall,
who had found that this power "comprehend[ed] all that is required for the regulation of our
intercourse with the Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
Almost ninety years later, the Supreme Court found it "generally recognized" that the
source of federal authority over Indian affairs derives from the commerce power, U.S. CONST.
art. I, §8, cl. 3, and from the treaty-making power, U.S. CONST. art. 11, §2, cl. 2. McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
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authority not in the Constitution, but in the guardian-ward relation between
the United States and the tribes first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.7
To justify this conclusion, the Court undertook a wide-ranging discussion
of the "anomalous ... and . . . complex character 5 8 of the Government's rela-
tion with Indian tribes. The Court found that the tribes had always been
"regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their
tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes
of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their inter-
nal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union
or of the State within whose limits they resided." 9 The Court stressed the depen-
dent status of the tribes as "wards of the nation,"6 with a claim on the Govern-
ment for protection. 1 With that moral duty, the United States had the power
necessary to ensure the protection and safety of the Indian people.2
The Crow Dog and Kagama decisions are not inconsistent, but are properly
viewed as opposite sides of the Worcester coin. The Court in Crow Dog recog-
nized the vast, inherent governmental powers of tribes absent restrictions by treaty
or federal statute. In Kagama, the Court stressed the power of Congress to limit
Indian tribal self-government. 3 The refusal to base this authority in the Con-
stitution further expanded the scope of this power. The federal government has
power to do whatever it thinks necessary to protect its Indian-wards.14
57 118 U.S. at 383-85. See text accompanying notes 36 and 37 supra. This view is no
longer favored by the Court. See note 56 supra.
58 118 U.S. at 381.
59 Id. at 381-82. The Court supported this view with a discussion of the Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia and Worcester decisions, which it termed "[p]erhaps the best statement of [the
tribes'] position." Id. at 382.
60 Id. at 383.
61 Id. at 384.
62 Id. The Court in Kagama made clear that there was no role for the states to play in
ensuring the survival of the Indian people. Id. at 383-84. The Court realistically noted that
the tribes "owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection." Id. at 384.
The Court eloquently explained:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that govern-
ment, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise
is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
Id. at 384-85.
63 It has been suggested that the Major Crimes Act itself, upheld in Kagama, re-affirmed
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. See Note, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act of 1934, 70 MicH. L. REV. 955, 957 (1972). Congress understood the implication
of the Crow Dog decision, that unless federal legislation were enacted, tribes would retain
complete control over criminal offenses by tribal members against other members committed
on the reservation. Id. at 958.
64 It is often stated that Congress has "plenary power" over Indian affairs. This power,
therefore, is exercised to the exclusion of the powers of state governments. I Am. Indian
Pol'y Rev. Comm'n Final Rep. 106 (1977). Although the power of Congress over Indian
affairs is as broad as the authority of states over non-Indians, it is not absolute. Delaware
Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) ; F. Cohen, supra note 1, at 96.
Thus, congressional enactments in the area of Indian affairs are reviewable by the federal
courts and are subject to constitutional limitations, such as the Bill of Rights. Id.; United
States v. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946); United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S.
119, 123 (1938); Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375 (1937); Wallace v.
Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 422 (1907); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899).
In reviewing the action of Congress, however, the Court exercises considerable restraint, gen-
erally determining only whether a statute is tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's
[October 1978]
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INDIAN TRIBES
The reconciliation of these differing emphases on the nature of the federal-
Indian relation and the status of tribal governments was reached explicitly by
the Court in Talton v. Mayes. 5 In Talton, the Court held that the right to
grand jury indictments protected by the fifth amendment to the Constitution
does not apply to the local legislation of the Cherokee Nation.6 The Cherokee
Nation was found to exist as an "autonomous body, subject always to the par-
amount authority of the United States."67 Thus, the Court held that the crime
at issue was not an offense against the United States, but was an offense against
the local laws of the tribe. But this was not sufficient to decide the application
of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments. The Court was required to determine
whether tribal powers of local self-government are, in effect, federal powers. 9
The Court held that this question long ago was answered in the negative."
The Court in Talton had no trouble reconciling its decision affirming the
inherent powers of tribal self-government with the rule, as was articulated in
Kagama, that the exercise of these powers is subject to the supreme authority
of the Congress.7' A tribe's power to govern itself, which predates the Constitu-
tion, cannot be said to have been created by that charter or by any act of the
government it established.72
Thus it was that the unique, anomalous, and complex federal-Indian rela-
tion entered the twentieth century. Chief Justice Marshall's basic formulation
had survived, although the Court at times shifted its emphasis with the question
presented and with the times in which it served.73 Indian tribes are governments
recognized, not created, by the Constitution and by the federal government.
unique obligation toward the Indians. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); Delaware
Tribal Business Ccmmittee, 430 U.S. at 85.
65 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
66 Id. at 382-83, 385.
67 Id. at 379-80. The Court explained: "And from this fact there has consequently been
conceded to exist in that nation power to make laws defining offences and providing for the
trial and punishment of those who violate them when the offences are committed by one
member of the tribe against another one of its members within the territory of the nation."
Id. at 380.
68 Id. at 381.
69 Id. at 382-83. When Talton was decided, the Court followed the rule established in
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), that the Bill of Rights limited only the
federal government, not state governments. See 163 U.S. at 382. The incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and thus as a limit
on state governments, did not affect the Talton rule. The Talton decision most recently was
reaffirmed in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S:Ct. 1670, 1676 & n.7 (1978).
70 163 U.S. at 383.
71 Id. at 384. The Court reasoned that "the existence of the right in Congress to regulate
the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exercised does not
render such local powers Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of the
United States." Id.
72 Id.
73 1 Am. Indian Pol'y Rev. Comm'n Final Rep. 101 (1977). An excellent and exhaustive
summary of the historical development of Indian- legislation and judicial decisions is found
in Comment, The Indian Battle For Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1970). The
author chronicles the "continuing fluctuations in [congressional] policy and programs of the
sort which have plagued Indians since the 1820's." See id. at 485. He finds the Supreme
Court's treatment of Indian issues to be far more constant, favoring "separationist and anti-
assimilationist results." Id. at 486. The author considers Indian tribes to be in a "unique
position as a congressionally acknowledged, and judicially and historically confirmed, third unit
of government within the nation but not included in the federal system. . . ." Id. at 487.
See also 1 Am. Indian Pol'y Rev. Comm'n Final Rep. 571-612 (1977) (dissenting views of
Rep. Lloyd Meeds); Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal
System: Inherent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600 (1976).
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Their independence and sovereignty were limited, but not destroyed, by discovery
and conquest. The capability and right of Indian people to govern themselves
were recognized unless limited by the dominant sovereign, which could exercise
plenary power7 ' to control Indian affairs when it so chose.
III. The State Infringement Test and the
Doctrine of Federal Preemption
From its decisions in Worcester to Kagama, the Supreme Court had found
no role for states in the administration of Indian affairs. In these decisions, the
Court made clear that the power to supervise tribal affairs rested solely with
Congress and that states could not extend their jurisdiction to tribal lands. Once
again, however, tribal sovereignty, as an "evolving doctrine,"75 yielded to the
practical requirements of changing circumstances.
As the country expanded and developed across the continent, pressure for
state encroachment on tribal government increased. Many Indian reservations
became less isolated with their boundaries less discernible. Largely because of
shifts in congressional policy, non-Indians at times were allowed to purchase
land and reside on certain reservations. Increasingly, non-Indians conducted
business on tribal lands and with tribal members.
In Williams v. Lee,7" the Supreme Court re-examined the question answered
decisively in Worcester: Whether, and if so, to what extent, states can extend
their laws to Indian reservations. In Williams, a non-Indian who operated a
general store on the Navajo reservation brought an action in state court against
a Navajo couple, who resided on the reservation, to collect goods sold them on
credit . 7 The Arizona Supreme Court had held that the state court could exer-
cise jurisdiction because no act of Congress had forbidden the state from doing
so. The United States Supreme Court reversed.79
The Court found that the "broad principles" established by Worcester had
been modified in cases where essential tribal relations would not be affected and
where the rights of Indian people would not be jeopardized."0 The "basic policy"
of Worcester, however, was intact."1 The Court thus constructed the state in-
fringement test: "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always
been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them." 2 In its dealings with the Navajo
Tribe, Congress had not departed from its consistent assumption that states have
no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation." The Court held
that to allow the state courts to exercise jurisdiction over an ordinary debt col-
74 See note 64 supra.
75 See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
76 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
77 Id. at 217-18.
78 Id. at 218.
79 Id. at 223.
80 Id. at 219. The Court found that Indian tribes had given up their complete indepen-
dence as sovereign nations in exchange for federal protection, aid, and land grants. Id. at 218.
81 Id. at 218.
82 Id. at 220.
83 Id. at 220-22. The Court noted that it had "consistently guarded the authority of
Indian governments over their reservations." Id. at 223.
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lection action would undermine the authority of the tribal courts and, thus, would
infringe on the right of self-government.8 4
The modification of Worcester's absolute ban on state interference is not
dramatically changed by the state infringement test because, by definition, a
significant intrusion by the state would infringe on the right of tribal self-govern-
ment and thus be invalid. Further, the Supreme Court has limited the Williams
test to controversies between Indians and non-Indians; the state has no interest
in extending its jurisdiction to on-reservation disputes between reservation
Indians."s
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Williams decision was the Court's
approach to the question of state jurisdiction. The state court had looked for an
act of Congress that precluded its jurisdiction; however, the Supreme Court
looked for an act of Congress that granted the state court jurisdiction. Without
such an affirmative grant, the question becomes whether the state's assertion inter-
feres with tribal self-government. If it does, it must give way. As in Worcester,
the Court intertwined the doctrines of tribal sovereignty and federal preemption
to preserve the tribes' right to govern themselves without state interference, except
to the extent Congress legislates otherwise. 6
It was this jurisdictional scheme that appeared threatened by the Court's
decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission. 7 There the Court
held that Arizona did not have power to impose a personal income tax on a
reservation Indian whose entire income was derived from reservation sources.8 8
The Court's analysis, however, was confusing and the precedential value of
Worcester, for the first time, was called into question. The Court detected a
trend away from the "platonic" idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to
state jurisdiction 9 and toward a reliance on the doctrine of federal preemption."
The sovereignty doctrine is relevant, not because it resolves the issue of state
jurisdiction, but because it provides a "backdrop" against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes that define the limits of state power must be read.0 '
84 Id. at 223.
85 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973); Kennerly
v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971). See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382,
386 (1976).
86 The Court followed a similar approach in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax
Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). There the Court held that the state sales tax could not
be imposed on a company that does business with Indians on the Navajo reservation con-
sistently with federal statutes applicable to the Navajos. Id. at 685-86. The Court indicated
that the federal government had always permitted Indians "largely to govern themselves" and
had exercised control over those who wished to trade with Indians. Id. at 686-87. The Court
found that "[c]ertain state laws have been permitted to apply to activities on Indian reser-
vations, where those laws are specifically authorized by acts of Congress, or where they clearly
do not interfere with federal policies concerning the reservation." Id. at 687 n.3. Otherwise,
Indian people govern themselves without state interference. Id. at 686-87, 690.
87 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
88 Id. at 165.
89 Id. at 172. The Court viewed the Worcester principle to hold that Indian reservations
are separate, dependent nations and thus, "that state law could have no role to play within
the reservation boundaries." Id. at 168.
90 Id. at 172. The Court read the "modern cases" to look to applicable treaties and
statutes which define the limits of state power. Id.
91 Id. The Court nonetheless cautioned, "It must always be remembered that the various
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty
long predates that of our own Government." Id.
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Under the Navajo treaty and the relevant statutes, the Court found that the
state did not have power to collect the tax at bar.
92
It was not clear from the Court's analysis in McClanahan whether the state
infringement test of Williams had been turned about. Under the Williams test,
one seeks a specific act of Congress to grant state jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The Court's preemption analysis in McClanahan, however, could be
read to require an act of Congress explicitly to grant the tribe jurisdiction which,
in turn, would preclude state infringement.
This confusion was continued in the companion decision to McClanahan,
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.9" In Mescalero, the Court indicated that the
"cconceptual clarity" of the Worcester approach had "given way to more indi-
vidualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes, including
statehood enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect the respective rights
of States, Indians and the Federal Government."94 The Court nevertheless read
McClanahan as settling the proposition that states have no power to tax Indian
reservation lands or Indian income derived from on-reservation activity absent
congressional consent.9"
In Bryan v. Itasca County,6 the Court again discussed the McClanahan
decision as having derived from a general preemption analysis. 7 The Court in
Bryan made clear, however, that this preemption analysis gives a special effect
to "the plenary and exclusive power of the Federal Government to deal with
Indian tribes. . . ." and to the power of Congress to protect tribes against state
interference. " The Court read the McClanahan and Williams opinions to be
in harmony, indicating that state laws generally do not apply to tribal Indians
92 Id. at 173.
93 411 U.S. 145 (1973). In Mescalero, the Court held that the state of New Mexico had
power to impose a tax on the gross receipts of a ski resort operated by the tribe outside its
reservation boundaries, but did not have power, under the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 25 U.S.C. §465 (1976), to impose a use tax on certain personalty purchased out-of-
state and used in connection with the resort, 411 U.S. at 157-58. The Court held, inter alia,
that the resort was not a federal instrumentality constitutionally immune from state taxes and
that Indians going beyond reservation boundaries generally are subject to nondiscriminatory
state law, absent express federal law to the contrary. Id. at 148-50.
94 411 U.S. at 148. The question addressed by the Court in Mescalero was whether
"paramount federal law permits these taxes to be levied." Id. at 146.
95 Id. at 148. This interpretation of McClanahan is consistent with the Court's treatment
of the question before it, which it articulated to reach beyond the Navajo reservation:
"[Wihether a State may tax a reservation Indian for income earned on the reservation."
411 U.S. at 180.
The Court re-asserted this reading of McClanahan in Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1976). In Moe, the Court
held that the state did not have power to impose a personal property tax or a cigarette sales
tax on reservation Indians, except that the state did have power to tax the on-reservation
sale of cigarettes by tribal members to non-members. Id. at 480-81. The sales tax at issue,
under state law, was a tax on the buyer; the seller was merely a collector. Id. at 482. The
Court held that the state requirement that the tribal seller collect a tax on non-Indians was
a "minimal burden" that in no way frustrated self-government. Id. at 483.
96 426 U.S. 373 (1976). In Bryan, the Court held that section 4 of (originally enacted as
Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, §4, 67 Stat. 588) 28 U.S.C. §1360 (1976) does not provide
a county with authority to tax personal property owned by a tribal member and located on
the reservation. 426 U.S. at 375.
97 Id. at 376 n.2. The Court found support for its preemption analysis from the Indian
sovereignty doctrine, the Government's historical policy of leaving Indians free from state
jurisdiction, and from the extensive federal regulation of tribes and their reservations. Id.
98 Id.
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on the reservation absent explicit provision by Congress.9 The Court again inter-
twined the doctrines of tribal sovereignty and federal preemption, observing
that "this preemption model" would necessitate a different conclusion if the
Indians are not truly self-governing."'
Thus, without admitting it, the Court returned to the Worcester principle
that the central government only has authority to deal with Indiin affairs and
that the federal-Indian relation is an exclusive one. States can extend fleir juris-
diction to Indian reservations only to the extent explicitly allowed by Congress
or to the extent they do not infringe on the tribal right of self-government.
Although the Court had eschewed the high-sounding tones of sovereignty and had
embraced, in its judgment, the more practical application of preemption analysis,
the results obtained in Williams, McClanahan, and Bryan are precisely the same
as that which would follow from Worcester.'
IV. The October, 1977, Supreme Court Term and the
Doctrine of Inherent Sovereignty
Although the Court's explication of its preemption analysis in Bryan yields
identical results with the sovereignty analysis of Worcester when resolving issues
of state jurisdiction over Indian affairs, this is not so when one considers the
inherent powers of self-government resting in tribes. The doctrine of federal
pre-emption is grounded on the supremacy clause of the Constitution and, by
definition, comes into play only when one must decide whether a state law is
inconsistent with paramount federal law. 2 A body of Federal Indian Law
based solely on the doctrine of federal preemption, carried to its logical end,
would hold that Indian tribes are without inherent powers of self-government,
but possess and can exercise only those powers given by Congress.' The Court,
however, has never gone that far.
If one were to accept the Worcester view of tribes as sovereigns, albeit con-
quered and dependent, and of federal treaties and statutes as recognizing, rather
than as creating, this special status, a different result is obtained. This view of
the inherent powers of Indian tribes was best articulated by Mr. Felix Cohen,
the dean of Federal Indian Law, who found that three basic principles govern
99 Id.
100 Id. See note 97 supra. This is consistent with the preemption analysis of McClanahan,
where the Court stressed at the outset that it was not "dealing with Indians who have left or
never inhabited reservations set aside for their exclusive use or who do not possess the usual
accoutrements of tribal self-government." 411 U.S. at 167-68.
101 Since the Williams decision, the Supreme Court has allowed state jurisdiction over
activity on Indian reservations only once, the very limited state interference permitted in
Moe. See 1 Am. Indian Pol'y Rev. Comm'n Final Rep. 119 (1977); note 95 supra.
102 U.S. CONST. art VI. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Cofitrary notwithstanding.
Id.
103 See e.g., I Am. Indian Pol'y Rev. Comm'n Final Rep. 573-82 (1977) (dissenting views
of Rep. Lloyd Meeds); Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal
System: Inherent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 600, 612-18




court decisions on the nature and extent of tribal powers.' First, Indian tribes
possessed all the powers of any sovereign state until conquered by the United
States. Second, this conquest rendered the tribes subject to the power of Con-
gress and terminated the tribes' "external powers of sovereignty,'.. but not their
"internal sovereignty." Third, the tribes' powers of local government, their
"internal sovereignty," unless expressly qualified by treaty or by Congress, remain
vested in tribal governments. In Mr. Cohen's view, the fundamental concept
of Indian law is that "those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe
are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but
rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which have never been extin-
guished."'0 s
The inherent, regulatory power of tribal governments was addressed by
the Supreme Court in 1975 in United States. v. Mazurie,.°7 where non-Indians
were convicted in federal district court for introducing alcoholic beverages into
the Wind River Indian Reservation.0 8 Congress had passed local-option legis-
lation allowing tribes to regulate the introduction of liquor into Indian Country.
1 0 9
The Wind River tribes adopted such an ordinance, requiring that retail liquor
outlets within their jurisdiction obtain tribal as well as state licenses."0 The
Mazuries were convicted of operating such an outlet without a tribal license.",-
The Court held, inter alia,"' that Congress had power under the commerce
clause to regulate the distribution of alcoholic beverages by non-Indians on land
held in fee by non-Indians but within reservation boundaries," 3 and that Con-
gress could delegate this authority to Indian tribes."4
The Mazurie decision did not uphold an independent exercise of power by
the tribe, but rather the authority of Congress to delegate a power of local self-
government to an Indian tribe."' The Court's rationale, however, is instructive.
The Tenth Circuit had struck down the delegation to what is viewed as an
"association of citizens.""' 6 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the limits
on the authority of Congress to delegate its power are less stringent where the
104 F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 123.
105 Mr. Cohen gives as an example the extinguishment of the tribes' power to treat with
foreign governments. Id. He notes, however, that some external powers were not extinguished
by conquest, such as the power to wage war and the power to treaty with the United States.
Id. at 123 n.8.
106 Id. at 122 (emphasis deleted).
107 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
108 Id. at 545. See 18 U.S.C. §1154 (1976).
109 419 U.S. at 547. Congress required that these tribal ordinances be approved by the
Secretary of the Interior and that they not violate state law. Id.
110 Id. at 548.
111 Id. at 549. The Mazuries had applied for a tribal license only after being warned that
they would be criminally liable if they continued operations without one. Their application
was denied after a public hearing during which witnesses protested the grant of a license,
complaining of shootings, disturbances of elderly persons residing nearby, and service to Indian
minors. The Mazuries closed their bar for three weeks, then re-opened. Operations continued
for approximately one year before federal officials initiated this prosecution. Id. at 548.
112 The Court also held that 18 U.S.C. §1154 (1976) is not unconstitutionally vague. In
the light of the bar's location, the statute was sufficiently clear to notify the Mazuries that their
bar was not excepted from tribal jurisdiction because of location in a "non-Indian commu-
nity." Id. at 553.
113 Id. at 553-56.
114 Id. at 556-59.
115 Id. at 557.
116 Id. at 556.
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entity exercising the delegated power "itself possesses independent authority over
the subject matter." 117 The Court read the Worcester line of decisions to establish
that tribes within their territory are considerably more than private, voluntary
associations."' It was the tribe's independent, or inherent, regulatory authority
that sustained this congressional delegation of power."'x
The issue reserved in Mazurie, the scope of the independent powers of
tribal governments, 2 ' was addressed this past term in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,"' where the Court held that Indian tribal courts do not have
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.' 22 The tribe's proffered juris-
diction was based not on an affirmative congressional authorization or treaty
provision, but rather on the tribe's assertion of its retained, inherent power to
govern on its reservation.' 23 The Court found that Congress, the Executive, and
the Federal Judiciary had shared the view through history that tribal courts
have no power to try non-Indians for criminal offenses.' 24
The Court conceded that Indian tribes have retained elements of govern-
mental authority. 2 Tribal governments, however, cannot exercise those powers
that are "exoresslv terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with
their status.' ,,"12 The Court thus extended Chief Justice Marshall's view of that
which was inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status, holding for the first time
117 Id. at 556-57.
118 Id. at 557. The Court explained:
Thus it is an important aspect of this case that Indian tribes are unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory
[citing Worcester (see text accompanying notes 39-45 supra)]; they are "separate
people" possessing "the power of regulating their internal and social relations..
[quoting Kagama (see text accompanying notes 54-64 supra)].
419 U.S. at 557.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 98 S.Ct. 1011 (1978).
122 Id. at 1014.
123 Id. at 1014, 1015. The Oliphant case did not present the best factual context in which
to judge the tribe's asserted powers of criminal jurisdiction. The Court found that the
Suquamish Indian Tribe was one of a series of aggregations of small, loosely -related, politically
autonomous Indian villages in the Pacific Northwest that were formed into tribes with
which the federal government could treat. The Court found the Port Madison Reservation,
home of the Suquamish, to be a checkerboard of tribal community land, allotted Indian lands,
fee land owned by non-Indians, and various county roads and highways. Id. at 1013 n.l.
Of the 2,928 persons who resided on the reservation, only 50 were tribal members. Id. at
1013 n.l. The persons arrested and tried in the present case were non-Indian residents of
the reservation. Id. at 1013.
124 Id. at 1015-19. This conclusion is questionable in the light of the cloudy history sur-
rounding tribal assertion of this power. For example, the Interior Department, at the time
of the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§461-79 (1976), con-
cluded that a tribe "might punish aliens within its jurisdiction according to its own laws and
customs. Such jurisdiction continues to this day, save as it has been expressly limited by the
acts of a superior government." Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14, 57 (1934). The Court
in Oliphant did not find that the federal government had "expressly limited" the claimed
tribal power. The Court did look to the treaty that established the Suquamish reservation,
in the Court's view of its historical perspective, and concluded that the Suquamish, by recog-
nizing their dependence on the United States, probably contemplated that the federal govern-
ment would arrest and try non-Indian intruders. 98 S.Ct. at 1019-20.
125 98 S.Ct. at 1020.
126 Id. at 1021. The Court reiterated Chief Justice Marshall's view that "[u]pon incor-
poration into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate power is constrained
so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty." Id. The Court ruled
that the tribal assertion of criminal power over non-Indians ignored that tribes are located
within the United States. Id. at 1022.
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that tribes are limited in the exercise of their local powers of self-government and
in their ability to protect their territory. 12 7 By submitting to the dominant sover-
eign, the tribes, in the Court's view, necessarily relinquished the power to try
non-Indians except in a manner acceptable to Congress.128
Any doubts raised by the Oliphant decision as to whether the Court still
regarded tribes as sovereigns, albeit diminished, were cast aside two weeks later
by the striking reaffirmation of the sovereign status of Indian tribes in United
States v. Wheeler."9 In Wheeler, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause
of the fifth amendment does not bar the prosecution of a tribal member in federal
court, notwithstanding a previous conviction in a tribal court of a lesser included
offense arising from the same incident." 0 The Court applied the rule that pros-
ecutions under the laws of separate sovereigns do not violate the double jeopardy
clause."' The Ninth Circuit had held that the dual sovereignty rule was inappli-
cable to successive prosecutions by an Indian tribe and the federal government
because tribes are not sovereigns, but derive their power to punish crimes from
the United States.
32
The Supreme Court fundamentally disagreed with the premise of the
appellate court and again adopted Mr. Cohen's view that the tribes' powers of
internal self-government are inherent, sovereign powers."' Although the tribes
are not full sovereigns, neither have they fully yielded their sovereignty."' The
Court found no problem integrating the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty
with an acceptance of Congress' plenary control over tribal governments:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited
character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to com-
plete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing
sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sover-
eignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary
result of their dependent status.
13 5
Thus, the Court concluded that the tribe's power to punish its members for
127 Id.
128 Id. The Court equated the importance of a sovereign's right to protect its territory
with the protection afforded by the United States to its citizens against "unwarranted intrusions
on their personal liberty." The power to punish criminal behavior, the Court maintained, is
an important manifestation of a government's power to restrict individual liberty. Id.
129 98 S.Ct. 1079 (1978).
130 Id. at 1091.
131 Id. at 1082-83. The "dual sovereignty" concept holds that a single act can result in
the commission of two offenses, that is, the transgression of the laws of separate sovereigns to
which the actor owes allegiance. This rule does not apply where successive prosecutions are
initiated by entities that only are "nominally different." Id. at 1083.
132 Id. at 1083-84. This argument was based on the plenary power of Congress over Indian
affairs. The logical extension of this power, it was contended, is that tribes are no more than
arms of the federal government. The Supreme Court held, however, that the extent of con-
gressional control was not crucial; rather, one must look to the "ultimate source" of the
tribe's power. The Court observed that the dual sovereignty rule applies to successive pros-
ecutions by a state and the federal government, although the latter can control the exercise
of state governmental powers. Id. at 1084. See also id. at 1090-91.
133 Id. at 1086.
134 Id. It is noteworthy that the Court cited its Oliphant decision in support of this funda-
mental concept.
135 Id. The Court found that the tribe at issue, the Navajo, had not relinquished its power
to punish tribal offenders. Id.
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tribal offenses is part of its own retained sovereignty.' 36
Although not specifically involving the inherent sovereignty of the tribe, the
Court's decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez3 demonstrates the commit-
ment of the Supreme Court to the principle that tribes are sovereign entities fully
capable of governing themselves. In Martinez, suit was brought to enjoin the
tribe from enforcing a tribal ordinance denying tribal membership to children
of female members who marry non-members, but extending membership to
children of male members who marry outside the tribe.'38 The membership
ordinance was found by the Tenth Circuit to violate the equal protection pro-
vision of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA). 39 The Court held,
however, that the ICRA does not authorize the bringing of civil actions to enforce
its protections against a tribe or tribal officers in the federal courts."'
Although the Martinez decision is one of statutory construction, the Court's
restrictive reading of the statute is based on its recognition of tribes as self-govern-
ing, separate sovereigns.'' The Court acknowledged that the ICRA was a valid
exercise of Congress's plenary power to limit the tribes' inherent powers of self-
government,' but was adamant in refusing to imply any interference with the
autonomy of Indian tribes that was not expressed by Congress.'4 3 The Court
refused to sanction such an intrusion into tribal sovereignty as to allow federal
judicial review of tribal actions, holding that the failure of Congress to provide
remedies other than habeas corpus in the ICRA was intentional.' 4 It is for the
tribe, with whatever forums they choose, to apply the protections of the ICRA.141
Read together, the Oliphant, Wheeler, and Martinez decisions comprise a
136 Id. at 1086-89. The Court supported this position with its earlier decision in Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra.
137 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
138 Id. at 1673.
139 Id. The ICRA provides that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-govern-
ment . . . shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws."
25 U.S.C. §1302(8)(1976).
140 98 S.Ct. at 1673-74.
141 See id. at 1675-78. See also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Kennerly
v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). The Court noted that although tribes early were
held not to constitute " 'foreign states' for jurisdictional purposes," they remain "quasi-
sovereign nations which, by government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in
many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and state governments." To
subject tribal actions to federal judicial review, in the Court's view, "may substantially inter-
fere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity."
98 S.Ct. at 1684.
142 98 S.Ct. at 1676-77, 1684.
143 Id. at 1678-79.
144 Id. at 1678-79, 1682-83. The Court also reaffirmed the doctrine of tribal sovereign
irlmunitv frnm suit. Td. at 1677. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S.
5uo, 51z-13 (1940). The Court held that an ICRA action even for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief could not be maintained against the tribe because the tribe's immunity from suit
was not waived expressly by act of Congress. The Court held, however, that the immunity
of the tribe did not bar an action against tribal officers. 98 S.Ct. at 1677.
145 98 S.Ct. at 1680-81. The Court in Martinez did leave open one possibility of federaljurisdiction to decide an ICRA civil claim. For those many tribes with constitutions requiring
that tribal ordinances not be given effect until the Interior Department approves (see F.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 130-31) "persons aggrieved by tribal laws may, in addition to pur-
suing tribal remedies, be able to seek relief from the Department of Interior," 98 S.Ct. at
1681 n.22 (dictum). The Court did not specify the type of relief available, but one may
argue that any "final action" taken by the Interior Department in this regard may be reviewed
in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires that agency action
be in accordance with federal statute (e.g., the ICRA). See 5 U.S.C. §706(2) (A) (1976).
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strong reaffirmation of the principle of Indian tribal sovereignty as first articu-
lated by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester. The Oliphant and Wheeler deci-
sions make clear that tribes retain their sovereign status. The application of
Worcester to cases determining the inherent powers of Indian tribes is similar to
that developed in recent cases considering the federal preemption of state powers
over tribes; the powers of tribal governments are limited only by express treaty
provisions, by act of Congress, or by implication if exercise of the power is wholly
inconsistent with the status of tribes as dependent entities located within the
territory of the United States.'46
In Martinez, the Court considered the independence of tribal governments
in the light of the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs. The question
presented was the power of the federal judiciary to review legislative decisions
made by tribal governments. The C -)urt reaffirmed the rule of Talton v. Mayes.4
that federal courts do not have this power under the Constitution and held that
Congress did not intend to extend them this power when it passed the Indian
Civil Rights Act. The Court admitted to reading the Act narrowly because
otherwise it would have intruded substantially upon the workings of tribal
governments.14 8
Thus, twin concepts emerge from these decisions. The Oliphant opinion
indicates that, absent express direction from Congress, the powers of tribal gov-
ernments must yield to those of the dominant sovereign when incompatible with
the responsibility of the federal government to discharge its fundamental obli-
gations to the citizenry. 4 ' The Martinez decision establishes just as clearly that
the Court, absent express direction from Congress, will not allow the dominant
sovereign to interfere with the responsibility of a tribal government to discharge
its fundamental obligations to its citizenry.
In a sense, the Oliphant and Wheeler decisions establish opposite principles:
Indian tribes have inherent power to arrest, try, and punish their members for
crimes committed on the reservation; they have no such inherent power over
non-members. This dichotomy raises a crucial question for tribal governments:
whether all tribal powers of self-government are likewise limited to members
of the tribe.
The Oliphant decision should not be extended to prevent the civil jurisdic-
tion of tribes over non-members. The Court in Oliphant did not question that
the trbes' sovereignty is territorial in nature, but held that this territorial sover-
eignty must yield in criminal matters because of the duty of the United States to
protect its citizens from "unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."' 5 °
146 See text accompanying notes 76-100 supra.
147 See text accompanying notes 65-71 supra.
148 See note 141 supra.
149 The Court, in fact, found in Oliphant that the three branches of the Government
considered tribal courts as having no power to try non-Indians for criminal offenses. See
text accompanying note 124. Although given "considerable weight," this finding was not
determinative of the Court's decision. 98 S.Ct. at 1019. The basis of the Oliphant decision
was the Court's conclusion that the assertion of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was
inconsistent with the status of tribes as dependent sovereigns located within United States
territory. See id. at 1021.
150 98 S.Ct. at 1021.
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This danger, notwithstanding the protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act,"'-
is significantly more acute when the tribe exercises its criminal rather than its
civil powers. Further, if the Court had upheld the power of tribes to punish
non-Indian criminals, a stream of knotty legal problems would inevitably have
flowed through the federal judiciary. The Court alluded to a very special prob-
lem present in the Oliphant case; non-Indians are excluded from Suquamish
tribal court juries."5 2
The Court has been much less sympathetic to the problems of non-Indians
in coping with the civil and regulatory jurisdiction of Indian tribes. In United
States v. Mazurie,"' the Court upheld the independent regulatory authority of
Indian tribes over non-Indians even when the exercise of this power resulted in
criminal conviction.' The Court held that the claim by the non-Indians that
they could not be subject to the laws passed by tribal governments, upheld by the
Tenth Circuit,' was definitively rejected in Williams v. Lee.' The Court read
Williams17 to settle the authority of tribal courts over non-Indians who transact
business on reservations with Indians."' Thus, in the language of Oliphant,
there is no corresponding "unwarranted intrusion""' 9 on the rights of non-Indians
if tribes subject them to their civil and regulatory laws when they engage in
activity on Indian reservations.'
This is consistent with the Court's decision in Martinez, which stressed the
importance of allowing tribes, as distinct societies with separate governments,
to erect their own rules to govern their own territory.'' Such a result is necessary
if tribes are to remain, to any practical extent, governments. It is this status
which the Court has nurtured, upholding the right of Indian people to govern
themselves in such a way that does not threaten the dominant position of the
151 Id. at 1022. The ICRA limits the sentences a tribe can impose to a prison term of
six months or a fine of five hundred dollars. 25 U.S.C. §1302(7) (1976). The Act also provides
criminal defendants a right to seek a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the
legality of a tribe's conviction. 25 U.S.C. §1303(1976).
152 98 S.Ct. at 1013. As another example, the ICRA does not require that tribal courts
appoint counsel for indigent defendants, but only that one may be represented by counsel in
tribal court at one's own expense. 25 U.S.C. §1302(6) (1976).
The Court realized, although it perhaps underestimated, that its decision restricted
the ability of tribes to deal with the serious problem of non-Indian crime on Indian reservations.
This, it observed, was a consideration for Congress when deciding whether to extend tribes the
power the Court denied. 98 S.Ct. at 1022.
153 419 U.S. 544 (1975). See text accompanying notes 107-120.
154 419 U.S. at 557-58. Significantly, however, the defendants were tried and convicted in
federal court with the full panoply of constitutional and statutory protections. Id. at 548.
155 Id. at 556.
156 Id. at 558.
157 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See text accompanying notes 76-86.
158 419 U.S. at 558.
159 See 98 S.Ct. at 1021.
160 This conclusion can be questioned with dicta by the Court in Wheeler. There the
Court observed that the areas in which "implicit divestiture of sovereignty," because of the
tribes' dependent status, had been found were "those involving the relations between an Indian
tribe and non-members of the tribe." 98 S.Ct. at 1087. Although the Court explained that
tribal powers of self-government, which involve only the relations among members of the tribe,
are retained, it did not indicate that all tribal powers that affect non-members are necessarily
lost. The Court, in its discussion, questioned neither the Williams nor the Mazurie decisions.
See id. at 1088. Dicta in the Martinez decision, by contrast, found that "[t]ribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudications of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." 98 S.Ct.
at 1681 (emphasis added).
161 See 98 S.Ct. at 1681.
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United States. The exercise of the criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would
create constitutional problems that such an exercise of civil powers would not.
In its trilogy of cases reasserting and refining the principle of tribal sover-
eignty, the Court acted in a manner consistent with its support in recent years of
Indian tribal governments. In Morton v. Mancari,'62 for example, the Court
upheld the preference of American Indians for employment with the Bureau of
Indian Affairs as reasonably designed to further Indian self-government.' 63 The
Mancari decision breathes a philosophy that extends beyond employment pref-
erence; the Court was concerned with preserving the "unique legal status of
Indian tribes under federal law"' 64 and the special relationship between this
country and its resident tribes.1"' Similarly, in Delaware Tribal Business Comm.
v. Weeks,'66 the Court found it quite logical to hold that organized tribal Indians
are something different from, and can have rights superior to those of, persons
with the same degree of Delaware blood but with no citizenship in the tribe.6 7
The Court's reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty is consonant with the collateral
strengthening of organized tribal society.
V. Conclusion
Indian tribes are governments. Their powers of self-government are recog-
nized, but not created, by the United States. Although once independent, by
discovery and conquest tribes have become nations within a nation. Their
location within the territory of the United States makes their status precarious;
tribes can exercise no powers that are wholly inconsistent with their position as a
dependent sovereign. Tribes are also subject to the plenary authority of the
United States to the extent the Government chooses to exercise it. States, except
as authorized by Congress, have no power to extend their laws to tribes within
their reservations. Unless inhibited by Congress, tribes retain their inherent
powers to govern on their territory.
This doctrine of tribal sovereignty, first articulated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall nearly 150 years ago, remains remarkably intact. The Supreme Court in
recent years, and especially in its 1977 term, has reaffirmed the right of tribes
to pursue a unique society within the territorial United States. The Court in
Wheeler recognized that the dependent sovereigns predate the dominant sover-
162 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
163 Id. at 554. The Court held that the employment preference did not constitute invidious
racial discrimination and, indeed, was not even considered a racial preference. Id. at 553.
The preflence, the Court found, was not directed toward a racial group, "Indians," but
rather toward .members of federally recognized tribes. Thus, the preference was political rather
than racial.. Id. at 553 n.24. This conclusion is consistent with decisions by the Court holding
that the special treatment often afforded Indians under federal law is not racially based and,
thus, is valid as a legitimate course of dealing with political groups with whom the Govern-
ment has a special relationship. See e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977);
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) ; F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 5.
164 417 U.S. at 551-52.
165 Id.
166 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
167 Id. at 85-90. The Court in the Delaware case upheld as rational an act of Congress
that distributed an Indian Claims Commission judgement fund to the tribe and its members
but that excluded a group of persons who traced their ancestry to members of the Delaware
Tribe as it existed at the time the Government breached its treaty obligation to the tribe. Id.
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eign and that the tribes' sovereignty, their right to make their own laws and be
governed by them, springs from a source other than the Constitution. It is in-
herent in their status as governments.
Although the Oliphant decision can be read to imply that the tribes' powers
of internal self-government can reach only tribal members, this interpretation is
far too restrictive. It ignores the Court's decisions in Williams and in Mazurie,
which held that non-Indians who transact business on an Indian reservation can
be bound by the exercise of tribal civil and regulatory powers. Such a reading
of O liphant is also belied by the Court's demonstrated commitment to the sover-
eignty of Indian tribes apparent in Wheeler and in Martinez. The Oliphant
decision is best limited to the sphere of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
members, which raises unique constitutional concerns.
The Court's decisions in the 1977 term, particularly Martinez, acknowledge
that tribes have great responsibility for their futures. Their legislative and execu-
tive decisions will make their policy. Tribal courts will balance the rights of indi-
vidual tribal members with those of the tribal society. This is as it should be;
it is the very nature of self-government.
